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Abstract. We propose an improved two-way continuous-variable quantum key
distribution (CV QKD) protocol by adding proper random noise on the receiver’s
homodyne detection, the security of which is analysed against general collective attacks.
The simulation result under the collective entangling cloner attack indicates that
despite the correlation between two-way channels decreases the secret key rate relative
to the uncorrelated channels slightly, the performance of the two-way protocol is still
far beyond that of the one-way protocols. Importantly, the added noise in detection is
beneficial for the secret key rate and the tolerable excess noise of this two-way protocol.
With the reasonable reconciliation efficiency of 90%, the two-way CV QKD with added
noise allows the distribution of secret keys over 60 km fibre distance.
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution can enable two authentic parties, the sender (Alice) and the
receiver (Bob), to obtain unconditional secret keys without restricting the power of the
eavesdropper (Eve) [1, 2]. On the premise of unconditional security, the higher key
rate and the longer distance are constantly pursued [3, 4]. To enhance the tolerable
excess noise of the continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV QKD) [5, 6], the
two-way CV QKD protocols are proposed [7, 8], where Bob initially sends a mode to
Alice, and Alice encodes her information by applying a random displacement operator
to the received mode and then sends it back to Bob. Bob detects both his original
mode and received mode to decode Alice’s modulations. Although the two-way CV
QKD protocols can remarkably enhance the tolerable excess noise [7, 8], it needs to
implement the tomography of the quantum channels to analyze the security under
general collective attack [7], which is complicated in practice. Therefore, we proposed
a feasible modified two-way protocol by replacing the displacement operation of the
original two-way protocol with a passive operation on Alice’s side [9]. However, the
source noise [10, 11, 12, 13, 14] and both detection efficiency and detection noise [15, 16]
on Bob’s side are not considered in the modified protocol.
It has been proved that adding a proper noise on Bob’s detection side in one-way
CV QKD can enhance the tolerable excess noise and the secret key rate in reverse
reconciliation [12, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21]. This idea has been applied to the original two-
way protocol in [22], while the scheme did not consider the correlation between the two
channels. The correlated noise affects the secret key rate [23, 24]. In this paper, we
apply the idea of adding noise to our modified two-way protocol Hom2M [9] to enhance
the tolerable excess noise and the secret key rate. Considering the correlation between
the channels, the security of the two-way CV QKD with added noise against entangling
cloner collective attacks [25, 26] is analysed and numerically simulated.
2. The two-way CV QKD with added noise in homodyne detection
The entanglement-based (EB) scheme of the two-way CV-QKD protocol Hom2N with
added detection noise is shown in figure 1(a), where the dashed box at B2 is the added
noise and the other part is our original two-way protocol Hom2M [9]. The added noise is
equivalent to an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pair with the variance of VN coupled
into the channel by a beam splitter with the transmittance of TN . The protocol Hom
2
N
is described as follows.
Step one. Bob initially keeps one mode B1 of an EPR pair with the variance of V
while sending the other mode C1 to Alice through the forward channel.
Step two. Alice measures one mode A1 of her EPR pair (variance: VA) to get the
variables {xA1X , pA1P } with a heterodyne detection, and couples the other mode of her
EPR pair with the received mode Ain from Bob by a beam splitter (transmittance: TA).
One output mode A2 of the beam splitter is measured with homodyne detection and
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Figure 1. (a) The EB scheme of Hom2N protocol. Bob keeps one half of the EPR
pair (EPR) and sends the other half to Alice. Alice measures one mode of her EPR
pair (EPR′) and one mode A2 from a beam splitter TA. The other mode from this
beam splitter is returned back to Bob. The letters (e.g. B1) beside arrows: the mode
at the arrow; E: Eve’s whole mode; the dashed box at A1: the heterodyne detection;
the dashed box at B2: the added noise. (b) The equivalent scheme to figure 1 (a) with
postprocessing. Bob uses a symplectic transformation Γk to change the modes B2 and
B1 into B3 and B4.
the other output mode Aout is sent back to Bob through the backward channel.
Step three. With a beam splitter (transmittance: TN), Bob couples another EPR
pair (variance: VN) which is equivalent to the added noise with his received mode.
The two modes N1 and N2 of this EPR pair are measured. Bob performs homodyne
detections on both modes B1 and B2 to get the variables xB1 (or pB1) and xB2 (or pB2),
respectively.
Step four. Alice and Bob implement the reconciliation and privacy amplification
[27, 28]. In this step, the measurement values of the modes B2, B1, A2, A1, N2 and
N1 are used to estimate the channel’s parameters and Bob uses xB = xB2 − kxB1
(pB = pB2+kpB1) to construct the optimal estimation to Alice’s corresponding variables
xA1X (pA1P ), where k is the channel’s total transmittance.
The prepare-and-measure (PM) scheme of the two-way protocol can be equivalent to
the EB scheme. In fact, Alice heterodyning one half of the EPR pair at A1 is equivalent
to remotely preparing a coherent state, and Bob performing homodyne detection on one
half of the EPR pair at B1 is equivalent to remotely preparing a squeezed state [25].
The homodyne detection preceded by an EPR pair coupled by a beam splitter at B2
is equivalent to Bob’s real homodyne detection with efficiency TN and electronic noise
[17]. Note that x and p quadratures are randomly measured in homodyne detection and
only x quadrature is analysed in the following.
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3. The analysis of the security against general collective attack
First, we show that the Gaussian attack is optimal to the two-way protocol Hom2N in
general collective attack. In figure 1(a), since all modes of Alice and Bob are measured,
Eve can get the purification of the state of Alice and Bob. In addition, the x and
p quadratures of Alice and Bob’s modes are not mixed via heterodyne or homodyne
detection and Alice and Bob use the second-order moments of the quadratures to bound
Eve’s information. Therefore, the two-way protocol Hom2N can satisfy the requirement of
optimality of Gaussian collective attack (i.e., continuity, invariance under local Gaussian
unitary and strong subadditivity) [29]. When the corresponding covariance matrix of
the state B2B1N2N1A2A1 is known for Alice and Bob, the Gaussian attack is optimal
[30, 31, 32, 33]. Therefore, only Eve’s Gaussian collective attack is needed to be
considered in the following security analysis.
In figure 1(a), the secret key rate of the two-way protocol Hom2N in reverse
reconciliation is [16, 34, 35, 36]
KR = βI(B : A)− I(B : E)
=
1
2
β log2
VAM
VAM |xB
− S(E) + S(E|xB), (1)
where β is the reconciliation efficiency, I(B : A) [I(B : E)] is the mutual information
between Bob and Alice (Eve), VAM and VAM |xB are Alice’s variance and conditional
variance, S(E) and S(E|xB) are Eve’s von Neumann entropy and conditional von
Neumann entropy on Bob’s data, respectively. In the following, S(E) and S(E|xB)
are calculated by the methods in [37].
For Gaussian state, the entropy can be calculated from its corresponding covariance
matrix [38]. Since the state B2B1N2N1A2A1E is a pure state, then S(E) =
S(B2B1N2N1A2A1). The corresponding covariance matrix of the state B2B1N2N1A2A1
is
ΓB2B1N2N1A2A1 =


γB2 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
C1 V I C6 0 C7 0
C2 C6 γN2 C8 C9 C10
C3 0 C8 VNI 0 0
C4 C7 C9 0 γA2 C11
C5 0 C10 0 C11 VAI


, (2)
where I is a 2 × 2 identity matrix, the diagonal elements correspond to the variances
of x and p quadratures of the modes B2, B1, N2, N1, A2 and A1 in turn, e.g.
γB2 = diag(〈x2B2〉, 〈p2B2〉), and the nondiagonal elements correspond to the covariances
between modes, e.g. C1 = diag(〈xB2xB1〉, 〈pB2pB1〉). Therefore, Eve’s entropy [39]
S(E) =
6∑
i=1
G(λi) =
6∑
i=1
G (fλi(αmn)) , (3)
where G(λi) =
λi+1
2
log λi+1
2
− λi−1
2
log λi−1
2
, and λi = fλi(αmn) is the symplectic
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eigenvalue of ΓB2B1N2N1A2A1 which is the function of the element αmn of ΓB2B1N2N1A2A1
[40, 41], seen in Appendix A.
Bob uses xB = xB2 − kxB1 to estimate Alice’s variable, which is equivalent to that
Bob uses a symplectic transformation Γk to change the modes B2 and B1 into the modes
B4 and B3 where the x quadrature of the mode B4 is xB4 = xB = xB2 − kxB1 [9], as
shown in figure 1(b). Since figure 1(b) is equivalent to figure 1(a) with postprocessing,
we use figure 1(b) to calculate S(E|xB) in the following.
After the symplectic transformation Γk, the corresponding covariance matrix of the
mode B4B3N2N1A2A1 is
ΓB4B3N2N1A2A1 = [Γk ⊕ I4]ΓB2B1N2N1A2A1[Γk ⊕ I4]T , (4)
where I4=⊕41I, Γk is a continuous-variable C-NOT gate [29, 42, 43]
Γk =


1 0 −k 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 k 0 1

 . (5)
Since the state B3N2N1A2A1E is a pure state when Bob gets xB by measuring the
modes B4, then S(E|xB) = S(B3N2N1A2A1|xB). The corresponding covariance matrix
of the state B3N2N1A2A1 conditioned on xB is [29, 44]
ΓxBB3N2N1A2A1 = γB3N2N1A2A1 − CB4 [XxγB4Xx]MPCB4 , (6)
where γB3N2N1A2A1 and γB4 are the corresponding reduced matrixes of the states
B3N2N1A2A1 and B4 in ΓB4B3N2N1A2A1 , respectively, CB4 is their correlation matrix,
Xx = diag(1, 0) and MP denotes the inverse on the range. Therefore, we have
S(E|xB) =
5∑
i=1
G(λ′i) =
5∑
i=1
G
(
fλ′
i
(α′mn)
)
, (7)
where λ′i = fλ′i(α
′
mn) is the symplectic eigenvalue of Γ
xB
B3N2N1A2A1
which is the function of
the element α′mn of Γ
xB
B3N2N1A2A1
[40, 41], seen in Appendix A.
By substituting equations (3) and (7) into equation (1), the secret key rate is
obtained
KR=
1
2
β log2
VAM
VAM |xB
−
6∑
i=1
G (fλi(αmn))+
5∑
i=1
G
(
fλ′
i
(α′mn)
)
. (8)
In experiment, Alice and Bob can calculate the element αmn and α
′
mn of equations
(2) and (6) by the measurement values of the modes B2, B1, N2, N1, A2 and A1.
Therefore, according to equation (8), the secret key rate in general collective attack is
obtained without the assumption that the two channels are uncorrelated. The analytic
representations of equation (8) is too complex to give here. We give a numerical
simulation in the following.
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Figure 2. The EB scheme of Hom2N protocol against entangling cloner attacks on
correlated channels. E1, E2: the modes introduced into the channels; T1/2: half beam
splitter; Tc: beam splitter. Alice and Bob are the same as figure 1(a).
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and VA = V = 20. (b) Optimal choice of the added noise xD.
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modulation for Hom2N protocol. (b) Secret key rate as a function of the transmission
distance for high modulation for Hom2N protocol, where ε = 0.2. The curves of (a)
and (b) are plotted for VA = V = 1000, nc = 0, TA = 0.8 and β = 1.
4. Numerical simulation and discussion of collective entangling cloner
attacks on correlated and uncorrelated channels
For simplicity in numerical simulation, when there is no Eve, the forward and the
backward channels are assumed to be independent with the identical transmittances T
and noises referred to the input χ = ε+ (1−T )/T , where ε is the channel excess noises
referred to the input. It is equivalent to Eve implementing two independent collective
entangling cloner attacks which are a Gaussian collective attack investigated in detail in
[45, 46]. When Eve implements more complicated two-mode attack [7], the correlation
between the two channels is induced. Figure 2 shows that Eve implements two correlated
entangling cloner attacks. On condition that Eve introduces the equivalent variances
of the modes E1 and E2 into the two channels, the noise referred to the input of the
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backward channel is χ2 = χ+2nc
√
TATε, where the second item on the right-hand side
is induced extra by the correlation between the two channels, i.e., the part of the mode
introduced into the backward channel correlating with the forward channel interferes
with the mode from Alice, nc =
√
1− Tc is the coefficient representing the degree of the
correlation, e.g., nc = 0 represents that the two channels are uncorrelated. The added
noise is χD = (1− TN )VN/TN . We can calculate the elements of equation (2)
γB2 = {VN − TNVN + TTN [VA − TAVA + TTA(V + χ) + χ2]}I,
γN2 = {TNVN + T (1− TN)[VA − TAVA + TTA(V + χ) + χ2]}I,
γA2 = [TAVA + T (1− TA)(V + χ)]I,
C1= −ηC6 = T
√
TATN(V 2 − 1)σz ,
C2=
√
(1−TN)TN{VN − T [VA − TAVA + TTA(V + χ) + χ2]}I,
C3=
1
η
C8 =
√
(1− TN)(V 2N − 1)σz,
C4= −ηC9 =
√
T (1−TA)TN
[√
TAVA−T
√
TA(V +χ)−nc
√
Tε
]
I,
C5= −ηC10 =
√
T (1− TA)TN (V 2A − 1)σz,
C7= −
√
T (1− TA)(V 2 − 1)σz ,
C11=
√
TA(V 2A − 1)σz , (9)
and
I(B :A)=
1
2
log2
T 2TAF + T (VA − TAVA + χ2) + χD
T (1− TA + χ2) + T 2TAF + χD , (10)
where σz= diag(1,−1), η=
√
TN/(1−TN), F =2V−2
√
V 2−1+χ. The typical fiber channel
loss is assumed to be 0.2 dB/km. V and ε are in shot-noise units. Substituting equations
(9) and (10) into equation (8), the optimal secret key rate KR and the optimal tolerable
excess noise ε of the two-way protocol Hom2N can be obtained by adjusting the added
noise χD.
When nc = 0, the two channels are uncorrelated, which is equivalent to Eve
implementing two independent Gaussian cloner attacks. For comparison, the heterodyne
protocol (Het) [47] and the homodyne protocol (Hom) [36] of one-way CV-QKD protocol
with coherent state and the original modified two-way protocols Hom2M and Hom-HetM
[9] are also given in figures 3(a) and 4(a). Figure 3(a) shows the tolerable excess noise
as a function of the transmission distance, where VA = V = 20, TA = 0.8, β = 90% and
nc = 0. The proper added noise χD is chosen to make ε of Hom
2
N protocol optimal.
The numerical simulation result indicates that the tolerable excess noise of the two-way
protocol with added noise is more than that without added noise and surpasses that
of the one-way CV-QKD protocol. Therefore, it indicates that properly added noise
is useful to enhance ε in the two-way protocol. Figure 3(b) shows the tolerable excess
noise ε of Hom2N protocol with different β, which indicates that the tolerable excess
noise ε increases with the increase of β.
Figure 4(a) shows the secret key rate as a function of the transmission distance,
where V = VA = 20, TA = 0.8, ε = 0.06, β = 90% and nc = 0. To make the secret key
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rate of Hom2N optimal, the proper added noise χD is chosen, as shown in figure 4(b). In
figure 4(a), the simulation result indicates that the two-way protocol with added noise
has higher secret key rate than that without added noise. Especially, the achievable
transmission distance of the two-way protocol Hom2N is over 60 km when β is 90%,
which is much longer than that of the one-way protocol. The reason is that the added
noise not only lowers the mutual information between Alice and Bob, but also lowers
that between Bob and Eve. When the effect on Eve is more than that on Alice and
Bob, the secret key rate is enhanced.
When nc 6= 0, the two channels are correlated. Figure 5(a) shows the secret key
rate as a function of the transmission distance for Hom2N protocol with different nc.
Considering the practical experiment [15, 16, 48], we choose ε = 0.06, β = 90%,
TA = 0.8, VA = V = 20 and nc = 0, 0.5, 1. To make KR optimal, the proper added noise
χD is chosen, as shown in figure 5(b). In figure 5(a), the simulation result indicates that
the distance of the secret key distribution decreases with the increase of nc. The reason
is that the correlation between the two channels induces the change of the excess noise
in the backward channel, which affects the secret key rate. Figure 5(a) shows that the
decrease of the secret key rate induced by this effect is small. In addition, comparing
with the one-way protocol in figure 4(a), despite the transmission distance of the two-
way protocol decreases slightly due to the correlation, the performance of the two-way
protocol is still far beyond that of the one-way protocols. Figure 5(b) shows that the
optimal added noise decreases with the decrease of nc.
In the following, we compare the two-way protocol with the one-way protocols
in high modulation. Figures 6(a) and (b) show the tolerable excess noise and the
secret key rate as a function of the transmission distance for high modulation, where
VA = V = 1000, TA = 0.8, β = 1 and nc = 0. The proper added noise χD is chosen
to make the tolerable excess noise and the secret key rate of Hom2N protocol optimal.
The numerical simulation result indicates that both the tolerable excess noise and the
secret key rate of the two-way protocol with added noise are much more than that of
the one-way CV-QKD protocols for high modulation.
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, we improve the two-way CV-QKD protocol by adding a proper noise on
Bob’s detection side. The security of the two-way CV-QKD protocol with added noise
in homodyne detection against general collective attack is analysed. The numerical
simulation under the collective entangling cloner attack is given for the correlated and
the uncorrelated channels. The simulation result indicates that despite the secret key
rate for the correlated channels is slightly lower than that for the uncorrelated channels
when Eve inputs equivalent variance of the modes into the two channels, the performance
of the two-way protocol is still far beyond that of the one-way protocols. In addition,
the properly added noise is beneficial for enhancing the secret key rate and the tolerable
excess noise of the two-way CV QKD. The optimal tolerable excess noise of the two-way
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CV QKD with added noise is much more than that of the one-way CV QKD. With
the reasonable reconciliation efficiency of 90%, the two-way CV QKD with added noise
allows the distribution of secret keys over 60 km fibre distance, which is difficult to reach
for the one-way CV-QKD protocols with Gaussian modulation in experiment.
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Appendix A. The calculation of eigenvalues
We use α′′mn to denote the elements of the corresponding covariance matrix Γn of a
n-mode state. The symplectic invariants {△n,j} of Γn for j = 1, ..., n are defined as [40]
△n,j= M2j(ΩΓn), (A.1)
where Ω = ⊕n1 iσy (σy standing for the y Pauli matrix) and M2j(ΩΓ) is the principal
minor of order 2j of the 2n× 2n matrix ΩΓ which is the sum of the determinants of all
the 2j × 2j submatrices of ΩΓn [40, 41].
The symplectic eigenvalues of the matrix corresponding to a four-mode state are
the solution of the four-order equation on the symplectic invariants [9, 29, 40]
f 2λ′′
1,2
(α′′mn)=
△4,1
4
−1
2
√
ζ+Θ± 1
2
√
2ζ−Θ−△
3
4,1−4△4,1△4,2+8△4,3
4
√
ζ+Θ
,
f 2λ′′
3,4
(α′′mn)=
△4,1
4
+
1
2
√
ζ+Θ± 1
2
√
2ζ−Θ+△
3
4,1−4△4,1△4,2+8△4,3
4
√
ζ+Θ
,
(A.2)
where
ζ =
△
2
4,1
4
−2△4,2
3
, Θ =
2
1
3H
3J
+
J
3 · 2 13 ,
H =△24,2−3△4,1△4,3+12△4,4, J =
(
L+
√
L2 − 4H3
) 1
3
,
L=2△34,2−9△4,1△4,2△4,3+27△24,3+27△24,1△4,4−72△4,2△4,4 . (A.3)
From equation (2), the covariance matrix ΓN1N2B2B1A2A1 of the modes
N1N2B2B1A2A1 can be obtained by permuting the corresponding elements of
ΓB2B1N2N1A2A1 . Applying a unitary transformation S = I⊕ ΓTN ⊕ I⊕ I⊕ I to equation
(2), we can obtain
STΓN1N2B2B1A2A1S =
(
ΓN1N ′2 0
0 ΓB′
2
B1A2A1
)
, (A.4)
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where
ΓTN =
( √
TNI
√
1−TNI
−√1−TNI
√
TNI
)
, ΓN1N ′2=
(
VNI
√
V 2N −1σz√
V 2N −1σz VNI
)
,
ΓB′
2
B1A2A1=


γ′B2 C
′
1 C
′
4 C
′
5
C ′1 V I C7 0
C ′4 C7 γA2 C11
C ′5 0 C11 VAI

 , (A.5)
and γ′B2 = [γB2−(1−TN)VN ]/TN , C ′i = Ci/
√
TN for i = 1, 4, 5. Therefore, the eigenvalues
of ΓB2B1N2N1A2A1 are λi = fλ1,2,3,4(αmn), 1, 1, where fλ1,2,3,4(αmn) are the eigenvalues of
ΓB′
2
B1A2A1 given by equation (A.2).
The symplectic invariants of ΓxBB3N2N1A2A1 are denoted as △5,j for j=1...5. It can
be proved that 1−△5,1+ △5,2−△5,3+△5,4−△5,5= 0. Therefore, one of the eigenvalues of
ΓxBB3N2N1A2A1 is 1 and the others have the same forms of equation (A.2), which needs the
replacement △4,1=△5,1−1,△4,2=△5,2− △5,1+1,△4,3=△5,4− △5,5,△4,4=△5,5 .
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